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   People	  tend	  to	  judge	  what	  is	  typical	  to	  be	  also	  good	  and	  appropriate—what	  one	  ought	  
to	  do.	  What	  accounts	  for	  the	  prevalence	  of	  these	  judgments,	  given	  that	  their	  validity	  is	  at	  best	  
uncertain	  (Hume,	  1740/2000)?	  We	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  tendency	  to	  reason	  from	  is	  to	  ought	  is	  
due	  in	  part	  to	  a	  systematic	  bias	  in	  people’s	  (nonmoral)	  explanations,	  whereby	  regularities	  (e.g.,	  
giving	  roses	  for	  Valentine’s	  Day)	  are	  explained	  predominantly	  via	  inherent	  or	  intrinsic	  facts	  
(e.g.,	  roses	  are	  beautiful).	  In	  turn,	  these	  inherence-­‐biased	  explanations	  license	  downstream,	  
value-­‐laden	  conclusions	  (e.g.,	  it’s	  good	  to	  give	  roses).	  Consistent	  with	  this	  proposal,	  4	  studies	  (N	  
=	  517	  children	  and	  adults)	  suggested	  that	  the	  inherence	  bias	  in	  explanation	  fosters,	  from	  an	  
early	  age,	  inferences	  that	  imbue	  observed	  reality	  with	  value.	  Given	  that	  explanations	  
fundamentally	  determine	  how	  people	  understand	  the	  world,	  the	  inherence	  bias	  in	  these	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   In	  his	  dissent	  with	  the	  recent	  Supreme	  Court	  decision	  to	  make	  marriage	  a	  constitutional	  
right	  (thereby	  allowing	  gay	  couples	  to	  marry),	  Chief	  Justice	  Roberts	  argued	  that	  heterosexual	  
marriage	  has	  been	  around	  “for	  millennia”	  in	  societies	  all	  over	  the	  world:	  “the	  Kalahari	  Bushmen	  
and	  the	  Han	  Chinese,	  the	  Carthaginians	  and	  the	  Aztecs”	  (Obergefell	  v.	  Hodges,	  2015).	  A	  possible	  
reading	  of	  this	  remark	  is	  that	  we	  should	  take	  what	  is	  typical	  as	  a	  signpost	  for	  what	  is	  good—
how	  things	  ought	  to	  be.1	  Whatever	  the	  correct	  interpretation	  here,	  the	  tendency	  to	  move	  
seamlessly	  from	  is	  to	  ought	  is	  a	  mainstay	  of	  everyday	  reasoning	  (Hume,	  1740/2000;	  for	  a	  
review,	  see	  Eidelman	  &	  Crandall,	  2014).	  Note,	  however,	  that	  the	  validity	  of	  such	  is–ought	  
inferences	  is	  at	  best	  uncertain.	  The	  mere	  existence	  of	  a	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  does	  not,	  in	  and	  of	  
itself,	  reveal	  that	  people	  ought	  to	  behave	  that	  way	  or	  that	  the	  behavior	  is	  good:	  Think	  of	  
slavery,	  for	  instance,	  or	  child	  labor.	  Both	  were	  common	  throughout	  history.	  Why,	  then,	  do	  
people	  draw	  these	  inferences	  so	  readily	  and	  find	  them	  so	  persuasive?	  	  
Our	  goal	  here	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  psychological	  underpinnings	  of	  this	  tendency—an	  issue	  
that	  is	  largely	  unexplored.	  We	  propose	  that	  the	  permeable	  boundary	  between	  is	  and	  ought	  is,	  
in	  part,	  a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  basic	  processes	  that	  underlie	  explanation.	  Across	  development,	  
everyday	  explanations	  are	  often	  generated	  off	  the	  cuff	  rather	  than	  via	  careful	  deliberation	  (e.g.,	  
Cimpian	  &	  Salomon,	  2014a,b;	  Wilson	  &	  Keil,	  1998).	  The	  heuristic	  nature	  of	  this	  process	  gives	  
rise	  to	  systematic	  bias	  in	  the	  explanations	  generated,	  ultimately	  leading	  people	  to	  overestimate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Alternatively,	  this	  could	  be	  a	  Burkean	  argument	  about	  the	  value	  of	  institutions	  that	  have	  withstood	  the	  test	  of	  
time	  (Burke,	  1790/2012).	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the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  phenomena	  being	  explained	  ought	  to	  be	  that	  way.2	  We	  detail	  this	  
proposal	  below,	  before	  describing	  the	  four	  studies	  that	  tested	  it.	  
The	  Explanatory	  Roots	  of	  Is–Ought	  Inferences	  
	   The	  motivation	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  one’s	  experiences	  is	  present	  even	  in	  infants	  (e.g.,	  
Baillargeon,	  1994;	  Saxe,	  Tenenbaum,	  &	  Carey,	  2005).	  Many	  of	  the	  phenomena	  we	  observe	  are	  
complex,	  however,	  and	  our	  cognitive	  systems	  are	  limited	  in	  many	  respects	  that	  affect	  
explanation	  (e.g.,	  retrieval	  from	  long-­‐term	  memory	  is	  fallible;	  working	  memory	  capacity	  is	  
highly	  constrained).	  By	  necessity,	  then,	  people	  must	  settle	  for	  “good	  enough”	  when	  coming	  up	  
with	  explanations	  (Cimpian	  &	  Salomon,	  2014a,b;	  Thomas,	  Dougherty,	  &	  Buttaccio,	  2014;	  Wilson	  
&	  Keil,	  1998),	  as	  they	  do	  with	  respect	  to	  other	  judgments	  (e.g.,	  Kahneman,	  2011;	  Shah	  &	  
Oppenheimer,	  2008;	  Stanovich	  &	  West,	  2000).	  That	  is,	  people	  often	  take	  whatever	  information	  
they	  can	  retrieve	  on	  the	  spot	  and	  use	  it	  to	  assemble	  a	  heuristic	  explanation—an	  explanation	  
that,	  while	  not	  guaranteed	  to	  be	  accurate,	  seems	  intuitively	  plausible.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  everyday	  explanations	  tend	  to	  be	  based	  on	  information	  that’s	  easily	  
retrieved	  has	  an	  important	  corollary:	  Any	  systematic	  biases	  in	  the	  content	  of	  this	  most-­‐
accessible	  information	  are	  likely	  to	  also	  bias	  the	  explanations	  generated.	  Relevant	  to	  this	  
argument,	  when	  retrieving	  information	  about	  an	  entity,	  the	  information	  that	  comes	  to	  mind	  
first	  tends	  to	  concern	  the	  entity	  itself	  (hereafter,	  inherent	  information)	  rather	  than	  its	  context,	  
its	  history,	  or	  its	  relations	  with	  other	  entities	  (hereafter,	  extrinsic	  information)	  (e.g.,	  Ashcraft,	  
1978;	  Hussak	  &	  Cimpian,	  2014;	  McRae,	  Cree,	  Seidenberg,	  &	  McNorgan,	  2005).	  For	  example,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Is–ought	  inferences	  are	  sometimes	  confused	  with	  the	  naturalistic	  fallacy	  (Moore,	  1903),	  which	  is	  the	  
(conceptually	  distinct)	  assumption	  that	  what	  is	  natural	  is	  also	  good.	  The	  naturalistic	  fallacy	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  
this	  research.	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when	  thinking	  about	  roses,	  people	  may	  immediately	  retrieve	  inherent	  facts	  such	  as	  that	  roses	  
have	  a	  beautiful	  look	  and	  a	  sweet	  smell.	  In	  contrast,	  extrinsic	  facts	  about	  roses	  that	  are	  also	  
available	  in	  memory	  (e.g.,	  that	  flower	  shops	  sell	  them	  year-­‐round)	  are	  seldom	  among	  the	  first	  
retrieved.	  	  
This	  retrieval	  bias	  leaves	  its	  mark	  on	  the	  process	  of	  generating	  explanations,	  skewing	  the	  
output	  of	  this	  process	  toward	  inherence	  (Cimpian,	  2015;	  Cimpian	  &	  Salomon,	  2014a,b).	  For	  
example,	  when	  wondering	  why	  roses	  are	  a	  typical	  gift	  for	  Valentine’s	  Day,	  an	  intuitive	  answer	  
might	  appeal	  to	  their	  beautiful	  look.	  However,	  this	  easy	  inherent	  explanation3	  would	  miss	  the	  
mark.	  The	  actual	  reason	  we	  buy	  roses	  on	  Valentine’s	  Day	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  
Valentine’s	  Day	  grew	  in	  popularity,	  businesses	  needed	  a	  flower	  that	  could	  be	  imported	  in	  bulk	  
from	  remote	  countries	  with	  milder	  February	  temperatures	  (NPR’s	  Planet	  Money,	  February	  13,	  
2015).	  The	  contrast	  between	  the	  more	  intuitive	  answer	  and	  the	  actual	  (largely	  extrinsic)	  
explanation	  for	  the	  association	  between	  roses	  and	  Valentine’s	  Day	  illustrates	  the	  broad	  
inherence	  bias	  that	  characterizes	  heuristic	  explanations—a	  bias	  for	  which	  there	  is	  considerable	  
experimental	  evidence	  in	  both	  children	  and	  adults	  (e.g.,	  Cimpian	  &	  Steinberg,	  2014;	  Hussak	  &	  
Cimpian,	  in	  press;	  Salomon	  &	  Cimpian,	  2014;	  Sutherland	  &	  Cimpian,	  in	  press).	  	  
But	  why	  would	  this	  inherence	  bias	  lead	  to	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  things	  being	  
explained	  ought	  to	  be	  that	  way?	  A	  plausible	  mechanism	  involves	  intuitions	  that,	  while	  not	  part	  
of	  the	  explanation	  process	  per	  se,	  are	  likely	  to	  form	  downstream	  of	  it.	  When	  a	  phenomenon	  is	  
explained	  via	  inherent	  features,	  it	  often	  acquires	  an	  aura	  of	  obviousness,	  even	  necessity:	  “Of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  In	  this	  case,	  an	  inherent	  fact	  about	  roses	  (i.e.,	  their	  appearance)	  is	  used	  to	  explain	  an	  extrinsic	  fact	  about	  them	  
(i.e.,	  that	  they	  are	  given	  as	  gifts	  for	  Valentine’s	  Day).	  The	  converse	  is	  also	  possible,	  as	  are	  inherent/inherent	  and	  
extrinsic/extrinsic	  combinations.	  However,	  the	  facts	  used	  to	  explain	  may	  be	  inherent	  more	  often	  than	  warranted.	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course	  we	  choose	  roses	  for	  Valentine’s	  Day,”	  one	  might	  reason.	  “They	  have	  the	  perfect	  look.	  It	  
couldn’t	  have	  been	  any	  other	  way.”	  In	  turn,	  if	  roses	  are	  the	  obvious	  choice,	  then	  it	  is	  reasonable	  
to	  also	  conclude	  that	  people	  ought	  to	  give	  roses	  (rather	  than	  other	  flowers)—that	  it’s	  a	  good	  
thing	  to	  do.	  In	  contrast,	  extrinsic	  explanations	  of	  a	  phenomenon	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  license	  such	  
value-­‐laden	  conclusions	  because	  they	  tend	  to	  highlight	  the	  contingent	  (vs.	  necessary)	  nature	  of	  
the	  explanandum—they	  reveal	  how	  things	  could	  have	  easily	  turned	  out	  otherwise.	  If,	  for	  
example,	  one’s	  explanation	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  historical	  transformation	  of	  Valentine’s	  Day	  
into	  a	  business	  opportunity,	  it	  may	  not	  seem	  necessary	  that	  we	  give	  each	  other	  roses	  for	  this	  
holiday,	  nor	  particularly	  desirable.	  Thus,	  the	  inherence	  bias	  in	  explanation	  may	  foster	  is–ought	  
inferences	  in	  part	  because	  inherent	  explanations	  are	  often	  accompanied	  by	  additional	  
intuitions	  about	  necessity	  (“it	  has	  to	  be	  this	  way”)	  and,	  subsequently,	  obligation	  (“one	  ought	  to	  
do	  it”).	  Note	  that	  neither	  of	  these	  inferential	  links	  is	  claimed	  to	  be	  deterministic—there	  will	  
undoubtedly	  be	  exceptions.	  We	  propose	  that	  explanations	  that	  rely	  exclusively	  on	  inherent	  
facts	  are	  generally	  more	  likely	  than	  explanations	  that	  include	  extrinsic	  elements	  to	  foster	  
additional	  intuitions	  about	  how	  things	  couldn’t	  have	  been	  otherwise,	  which	  then	  often	  give	  rise	  
to	  value-­‐laden	  judgments.4	  	  
Theoretical	  Contribution	  and	  Relation	  to	  Prior	  Work	  
	   The	  explanation-­‐based	  mechanism	  outlined	  here	  provides	  a	  means	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  
remarkable	  extent	  to	  which	  people’s	  ideas	  about	  should	  and	  ought	  mirror	  what	  they	  happen	  to	  
observe	  around	  them.	  Moreover,	  given	  that	  explanations	  are	  the	  primary	  vehicle	  through	  
which	  humans	  understand	  the	  world	  (e.g.,	  Keil,	  2006;	  Lombrozo,	  2012),	  a	  bias	  in	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  To	  be	  clear,	  it	  is	  the	  inherent	  vs.	  extrinsic	  nature	  of	  the	  explanation	  for	  a	  fact—not	  of	  the	  fact	  itself—that	  is	  
hypothesized	  to	  influence	  the	  likelihood	  of	  is–ought	  inferences.	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judgments	  is	  likely	  to	  exert	  a	  deep	  influence	  on	  sociomoral	  reasoning.	  This	  proposal	  adds	  a	  
unique	  perspective	  to	  current	  theories	  concerning	  the	  sources	  of	  value	  in	  people’s	  sociomoral	  
judgments	  (good/bad,	  right/wrong,	  etc.).	  For	  instance,	  prior	  research	  has	  suggested	  that	  
people’s	  evaluations	  of	  others’	  actions	  are	  also	  influenced	  by	  skeletal	  principles	  evolved	  via	  
natural	  selection	  (e.g.,	  Graham	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Hamlin,	  Wynn,	  &	  Bloom,	  2007;	  Sloane,	  Baillargeon,	  
&	  Premack,	  2012),	  domain	  distinctions	  constructed	  through	  early	  interactions	  with	  others	  (e.g.,	  
Helwig	  &	  Turiel,	  2011;	  Smetana,	  2006),	  and	  explicit	  knowledge	  acquired	  through	  socialization	  
and	  enculturation	  (e.g.,	  Dahl	  &	  Campos,	  2013;	  Shweder,	  Mahapatra,	  &	  Miller,	  1987).	  According	  
to	  our	  proposal,	  the	  explanatory	  bias	  under	  investigation	  here	  is	  an	  independent	  source	  of	  
sociomoral	  value	  that	  works	  in	  tandem	  with	  other	  such	  sources	  to	  shape	  how	  people	  
understand	  what	  is	  appropriate	  and	  right.	  
	   To	  clarify,	  our	  account	  goes	  beyond	  simply	  asserting	  a	  relation	  between	  explanations	  
and	  sociomoral	  reasoning.	  Such	  a	  relation	  is	  featured,	  although	  somewhat	  implicitly,	  in	  prior	  
accounts.	  For	  instance,	  social	  domain	  theorists	  have	  argued	  that	  people’s	  “informational	  
assumptions”—roughly,	  how	  they	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  certain	  phenomenon,	  such	  as	  abortion	  or	  
homosexuality—influences	  their	  evaluation	  of	  that	  phenomenon	  (e.g.,	  Turiel,	  Hildebrandt,	  &	  
Wainryb,	  1991;	  see	  also	  Eidelman	  &	  Crandall,	  2014).	  In	  contrast,	  here	  we	  propose	  and	  test	  the	  
causal	  influence	  of	  a	  specific	  key	  aspect	  of	  explanatory	  reasoning	  (namely,	  its	  inherence	  bias)	  
on	  sociomoral	  reasoning	  across	  development.	  On	  our	  view,	  this	  bias	  is	  essential	  to	  a	  
mechanistic	  understanding	  of	  is–ought	  inferences,	  and	  it	  also	  provides	  a	  new	  perspective	  on	  
the	  development	  of	  sociomoral	  judgment	  more	  generally.	  
Predictions	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   We	  tested	  three	  predictions	  of	  the	  present	  proposal.	  First,	  we	  tested	  whether	  the	  
inherence	  bias	  in	  participants’	  explanations	  predicts	  their	  tendency	  to	  make	  is–ought	  
inferences	  (Study	  1).	  Second,	  we	  tested	  whether	  this	  relationship	  is	  causal	  by	  experimentally	  
manipulating	  the	  bias	  in	  participants’	  explanations	  and	  measuring	  downstream	  effects	  on	  their	  
is–ought	  inferences	  (Study	  3).	  Third,	  we	  tested	  whether	  these	  predictions	  hold	  for	  children	  as	  
well	  (Studies	  2	  and	  4).	  Everyday	  explanations	  are	  inherence-­‐skewed	  even	  in	  children	  (e.g.,	  
Cimpian	  &	  Steinberg,	  2014),	  which	  suggests	  that	  this	  explanatory	  bias	  might	  foster	  is–ought	  
inferences	  throughout	  development.	  Evidence	  for	  developmental	  continuity	  in	  this	  respect	  
would	  also	  suggest	  that	  explanatory	  biases	  have	  ample	  opportunity	  to	  shape	  sociomoral	  
understanding.	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Chapter	  2	  	  
Study	  1	  	  
In	  Study	  1,	  we	  tested	  whether	  adult	  participants’	  preference	  for	  inherent	  explanations	  
predicts	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  infer	  ought	  from	  is.	  
2.1	  Method	  
Participants.	  The	  participants	  (N	  =	  122;	  Mage	  =	  37.2;	  SD	  =	  13.0;	  43	  men,	  88	  women)	  were	  
recruited	  from	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk	  service.	  Participants	  received	  $0.75	  for	  participation.	  
Nine	  additional	  participants	  were	  tested	  but	  excluded	  because	  they	  had	  IP	  addresses	  from	  
outside	  the	  United	  States	  (n	  =	  2)	  or	  because	  they	  failed	  the	  catch	  questions	  embedded	  in	  the	  
explanation	  measure	  (n	  =	  7;	  see	  below	  for	  detail).	  The	  sample	  size	  and	  data-­‐collection	  stopping	  
rule	  for	  this	  study,	  as	  well	  as	  subsequent	  ones,	  were	  determined	  with	  a	  power	  analysis	  using	  
effect	  sizes	  from	  studies	  on	  related	  topics	  (e.g.,	  Hussak	  &	  Cimpian,	  in	  press;	  Salomon	  &	  
Cimpian,	  2014;	  Sutherland	  &	  Cimpian,	  in	  press).	  	  
Materials.	  To	  test	  our	  prediction,	  we	  devised	  measures	  of	  participants’	  (1)	  tendency	  to	  
draw	  is–ought	  inferences	  and	  (2)	  preference	  for	  inherent	  explanations.	  The	  study	  also	  included	  
four	  control	  measures	  (assessing	  education,	  fluid	  intelligence,	  and	  political	  orientation),	  as	  
described	  below.	  
Is–Ought	  Inferences.	  Participants	  read	  six	  passages	  structured	  like	  press	  releases,	  and	  
modeled	  on	  actual	  press	  releases,	  that	  described	  a	  widespread	  societal	  practice	  (i.e.,	  what	  is).	  
For	  example,	  one	  was	  titled	  “America’s	  pizza	  obsession:	  By	  the	  numbers”	  and	  read	  as	  follows:	  
The	  quintessential	  American	  food	  may	  be	  apple	  pie,	  but	  its	  popularity	  pales	  beside	  
our	  national	  love	  affair	  with	  pizza	  pies.	  The	  Daily	  reports	  that	  Americans	  consume	  a	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staggering	  100	  acres	  of	  pizza	  a	  day,	  according	  to	  data	  from	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  
Pizza	  Operators	  (NAPO).	  	  	  
Over	  $38	  billion	  of	  pizza	  is	  sold	  in	  America	  annually,	  according	  to	  Pizza	  Today,	  and	  3	  
billion	  pizzas	  are	  sold	  in	  the	  U.S.	  each	  year	  according	  to	  NAPO.	  350	  slices	  of	  pizza	  sold	  
every	  second,	  according	  to	  NAPO,	  and	  the	  average	  American	  eats	  an	  average	  of	  46	  slices	  
of	  pizza	  year,	  according	  to	  Packaged	  Facts.	  Overall,	  a	  total	  of	  94%	  of	  Americans	  eat	  
pizza.	  
After	  reading	  each	  press	  release,	  participants	  were	  asked	  five	  questions:	  one	  is–ought	  question	  
(e.g.,	  “Do	  you	  think	  it	  should	  be	  that	  so	  many	  Americans	  eat	  pizza?”;	  1	  =	  “definitely	  no”	  to	  9	  =	  
“definitely	  yes”)	  and	  four	  fillers	  that	  served	  to	  camouflage	  the	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  study	  (e.g.,	  “Do	  
you	  think	  the	  amount	  of	  pizza	  sold	  will	  grow	  in	  the	  next	  5	  years?”,	  “What	  do	  you	  think	  accounts	  
for	  the	  current	  prices	  of	  pizza?”).	  Three	  of	  the	  press	  releases	  were	  accompanied	  by	  a	  should	  
question,	  as	  illustrated	  above,	  and	  the	  other	  three	  were	  accompanied	  by	  a	  good	  question	  (e.g.,	  
“Do	  you	  think	  that	  it’s	  good	  that	  so	  many	  Americans	  drive	  to	  work?”	  [1	  =	  “really	  not	  good”	  to	  9	  
=	  “really	  good”]	  after	  a	  passage	  claiming	  that	  88%	  of	  Americans	  drive	  to	  work).	  	  
	   It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  the	  press	  releases	  were	  purposely	  about	  behaviors	  that	  fall	  
outside	  the	  scope	  of	  most	  existing	  accounts	  of	  sociomoral	  reasoning	  (eating	  pizza,	  driving	  to	  
work,	  drinking	  coffee,	  owning	  a	  TV,	  using	  email,	  and	  watching	  football)	  so	  as	  to	  illustrate	  the	  
unique	  contribution	  of	  our	  account.	  All	  passages	  were	  factual	  in	  tone,	  without	  evaluative	  
language,	  to	  avoid	  influencing	  participants’	  normative	  judgments	  (see	  Appendix	  for	  full	  text).	  
	   Responses	  to	  the	  six	  is–ought	  questions	  were	  averaged	  into	  a	  composite	  (α	  =	  .58;	  lowest	  
item-­‐total	  correlation	  =	  .33)	  that	  served	  as	  our	  main	  dependent	  variable.	  (Notably,	  the	  results	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reported	  below	  remained	  the	  same	  when	  excluding	  the	  item	  with	  the	  lowest	  item-­‐total	  
correlation.)	  
Bias	  toward	  Inherent	  Explanations.	  Fifteen	  items	  were	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  participants	  preferred	  explanations	  in	  terms	  of	  inherent	  facts	  (e.g.,	  “Black	  is	  associated	  
with	  funerals	  because	  of	  something	  about	  the	  color	  black	  or	  about	  funerals—maybe	  because	  
the	  darkness	  of	  black	  conveys	  how	  people	  feel	  at	  funerals”;	  α	  =	  .85;	  lowest	  item-­‐total	  
correlation	  =	  .47;	  see	  Table	  1	  for	  other	  sample	  items).	  All	  items	  were	  scored	  using	  nine-­‐point	  
scales	  (1	  =	  “disagree	  strongly”	  to	  9	  =	  “agree	  strongly”)	  and	  were	  presented	  in	  a	  random	  order.	  
Note	  that,	  as	  with	  the	  Is–Ought	  measure,	  the	  items	  in	  the	  Inherent	  Explanations	  measure	  were	  
worded	  factually	  and	  did	  not	  contain	  evaluative	  language.	  Two	  catch	  items	  were	  included	  to	  
detect	  inattention	  (e.g.,	  “Please	  click	  on	  the	  number	  three	  below	  to	  indicate	  that	  you	  are	  paying	  
attention”).	  Participants	  who	  missed	  either	  of	  these	  catch	  items	  were	  excluded	  (n	  =	  7).	  	  
Control	  Measures.	  Four	  control	  measures	  were	  administered	  to	  investigate	  alternative	  
explanations	  for	  the	  predicted	  relationship	  between	  participants’	  explanations	  and	  their	  is–
ought	  inferences.	  These	  measures	  tap	  into	  dimensions	  that	  could	  potentially	  influence	  both	  
variables	  of	  interest,	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  correlation	  between	  them	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  causal	  
relationship.	  First,	  we	  measured	  participants’	  level	  of	  education	  (1	  =	  “Less	  than	  high	  school”	  to	  
6	  =	  “Doctoral	  (Ph.D.,	  J.D.,	  M.D.)”).	  Second,	  we	  measured	  their	  fluid	  intelligence	  with	  12	  Raven’s	  
Progressive	  Matrices	  (Raven,	  1960;	  see	  also	  Salomon	  &	  Cimpian,	  2014).	  Third,	  we	  measured	  
participants’	  political	  views	  (“How	  would	  you	  describe	  your	  political	  attitudes?”;	  1	  =	  “Strongly	  
liberal”	  to	  9	  =	  “Strongly	  conservative”).	  Fourth,	  related	  to	  the	  measure	  of	  conservatism,	  we	  
assessed	  participants’	  belief	  in	  a	  just	  world	  (e.g.,	  “Basically,	  the	  world	  is	  a	  just	  place”;	  Rubin	  &	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Peplau,	  1975).	  	  
Procedure.	  Participants	  were	  tested	  online	  via	  Qualtrics	  (Qualtrics	  Labs	  Inc.,	  Provo,	  UT).	  
The	  Is–Ought	  measure,	  the	  Inherent	  Explanations	  measure,	  the	  Belief	  in	  a	  Just	  World	  scale,	  and	  
the	  Raven’s	  Progressive	  Matrices	  were	  presented	  in	  random	  order.	  Item	  order	  was	  randomized	  
for	  all	  scales	  except	  the	  Raven’s	  Progressive	  Matrices,	  which	  were	  presented	  in	  increasing	  order	  
of	  difficulty.	  The	  measures	  of	  participants’	  education	  and	  political	  views	  were	  administered	  at	  
the	  end	  of	  the	  sessions,	  along	  with	  other	  demographic	  questions.	  Finally,	  participants	  were	  
debriefed.	  
2.2	  Results	  
	   As	  predicted,	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  inherence	  bias	  in	  participants’	  explanations	  was	  
significantly	  correlated	  with	  their	  tendency	  to	  draw	  is–ought	  inferences,	  r(120)	  =	  .30	  [.13,	  .46],	  
p	  <	  .001.	  Moreover,	  this	  relationship	  remained	  significant	  even	  when	  statistically	  adjusting	  for	  
participants’	  education,	  fluid	  intelligence,	  conservatism,	  and	  belief	  in	  a	  just	  world	  in	  a	  multiple	  
regression,	  β	  =	  .31	  [.12,	  .49],	  p	  =	  .001.	  None	  of	  these	  other	  variables	  approached	  significance,	  
|βs|	  <	  .11,	  ps	  >	  .25	  (see	  Table	  2	  for	  full	  regression	  results).	  	  
The	  results	  of	  Study	  1	  suggest	  that	  the	  inherence	  bias	  in	  participants’	  explanations	  
accounts	  for	  unique	  variance	  in	  their	  likelihood	  of	  drawing	  is–ought	  inferences,	  above	  and	  
beyond	  a	  number	  of	  control	  variables	  such	  as	  their	  education,	  intelligence,	  and	  political	  views.	  
Study	  2	  investigates	  whether	  this	  relationship	  is	  present	  in	  children’s	  thinking	  as	  well,	  which	  





Participants.	  The	  participants	  were	  80	  children	  aged	  between	  4	  and	  7	  (Mage	  =	  5.98	  
years,	  SD	  =	  1.13;	  40	  girls	  and	  40	  boys)	  who	  were	  recruited	  from	  a	  small	  city	  in	  the	  Midwestern	  
United	  States.	  We	  sampled	  4-­‐	  to	  7-­‐year-­‐olds	  to	  be	  able	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  about	  a	  relatively	  
broad	  stretch	  of	  development,	  as	  well	  as	  ensure	  that	  we	  would	  see	  sufficient	  variability	  in	  
children’s	  sociomoral	  and	  explanatory	  reasoning	  (e.g.,	  Cimpian	  &	  Steinberg,	  2014).	  Six	  
additional	  children	  were	  tested	  but	  excluded	  from	  the	  final	  sample	  because	  they	  refused	  to	  
complete	  the	  study.	  The	  children	  were	  mostly	  European	  American	  and	  represented	  a	  variety	  of	  
socioeconomic	  backgrounds.	  
Materials	  and	  Procedure.	  As	  in	  the	  preceding	  adult	  study,	  our	  main	  measures	  
concerned	  children’s	  (1)	  tendency	  to	  draw	  is–ought	  inferences	  and	  (2)	  preference	  for	  inherent	  
explanations.	  The	  order	  of	  these	  measures	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  participants.	  Between	  
the	  measures,	  children	  completed	  a	  1-­‐minute	  distractor	  task	  (coloring)	  that	  served	  to	  maintain	  
their	  engagement	  and	  minimize	  interference	  between	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  questions.	  	  
Is–Ought	  Inferences.	  Children	  were	  read	  a	  mock	  newspaper	  featuring	  four	  facts	  familiar	  
to	  young	  children	  (e.g.,	  money	  is	  green;	  see	  the	  Appendix).	  After	  reading	  a	  fact	  from	  the	  
newspaper,	  the	  experimenter	  asked	  children	  three	  is–ought	  questions	  pertinent	  to	  that	  fact:	  (1)	  
whether	  the	  fact	  was	  “good,”	  (2)	  whether	  it	  was	  “the	  way	  things	  should	  be,”	  and	  (3)	  whether	  it	  
would	  be	  “bad”	  if	  things	  were	  otherwise	  (see	  the	  Appendix).	  The	  good	  question	  was	  measured	  
on	  a	  four-­‐point	  scale	  (“no,”	  “sort	  of	  good,”	  “good,”	  and	  “really	  good”);	  the	  should	  question	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required	  a	  “yes”	  or	  “no”	  response;	  the	  bad-­‐if-­‐otherwise	  question	  was	  measured	  on	  a	  four-­‐point	  
scale	  (“no,”	  “sort	  of	  bad,”	  “bad,”	  “really	  bad”).	  The	  order	  of	  the	  newspaper	  facts	  and	  the	  is-­‐
ought	  questions	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  children.	  Children’s	  responses	  to	  these	  three	  
questions	  were	  converted	  to	  a	  common	  0–1	  scale,	  with	  higher	  scores	  indicating	  stronger	  is–
ought	  intuitions,	  and	  then	  averaged	  into	  a	  composite	  (α	  =	  .58;	  lowest	  item-­‐total	  correlation	  =	  
.52;	  M	  =	  .66,	  SD	  =	  .23).	  
Bias	  toward	  Inherent	  Explanations.	  We	  used	  a	  broad	  measure	  of	  children’s	  explanatory	  
preferences,	  adapted	  from	  prior	  work	  on	  this	  topic	  (Cimpian	  &	  Steinberg,	  2014;	  Sutherland	  &	  
Cimpian,	  in	  press).	  The	  first	  item	  in	  this	  measure	  asked	  children	  to	  evaluate	  inherent	  and	  
extrinsic	  explanations	  for	  everyday	  patterns	  (e.g.,	  birthday	  cakes	  have	  candles	  “just	  because	  
they	  are	  birthday	  cakes”	  [inherent]	  or	  “just	  because	  people	  thought	  it	  might	  be	  a	  nice	  idea”	  
[extrinsic]).	  Children	  used	  a	  four-­‐point	  scale	  to	  indicate	  their	  agreement	  with	  these	  
explanations	  (“really	  not	  right,”	  “sort	  of	  not	  right,”	  “sort	  of	  right,”	  and	  “really	  right”).	  	  
The	  other	  items	  in	  this	  measure	  tapped	  intuitions	  that	  might	  follow	  inherent	  
explanations.	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction,	  inherent	  explanations	  often	  make	  it	  appear	  that	  
the	  explanandum	  is	  necessary	  (rather	  than	  contingent).	  To	  assess	  these	  downstream	  intuitions	  
about	  necessity,	  we	  asked	  children	  the	  following:	  
(1)	  whether	  observed	  facts	  are	  temporally	  stable	  (e.g.,	  “Do	  you	  think	  birthday	  cakes	  will	  
always	  have	  candles,	  even	  way	  into	  the	  future	  when	  the	  last	  birthday	  cake	  is	  made?”;	  answer	  
options:	  “yes”	  or	  “no”),	  
	  (2)	  whether	  observed	  facts	  are	  inalterable	  (e.g.,	  “Imagine	  if	  people	  wanted	  birthday	  
cakes	  to	  not	  have	  candles,	  and	  everyone	  agreed	  that	  they	  wanted	  birthday	  to	  not	  have	  candles.	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Would	  it	  be	  okay	  to	  make	  a	  change	  so	  that	  birthday	  cakes	  do	  not	  have	  candles	  or	  would	  it	  not	  
be	  okay?”;	  answer	  options:	  “okay,”	  “sort	  of	  not	  okay,”	  “not	  okay,”	  and	  “really	  not	  okay”),	  and	  	  
(3)	  whether	  words	  are	  inherently	  suited	  for	  their	  referents	  and	  thus	  could	  not	  be	  
otherwise	  (e.g.,	  when	  people	  were	  first	  coming	  up	  with	  the	  name	  for	  a	  candle,	  “…could	  they	  
have	  called	  it	  something	  else,	  like	  a	  ‘diby’	  or	  a	  ‘peara’	  or	  did	  they	  have	  to	  call	  it	  a	  ‘candle’?”;	  see	  
Sutherland	  &	  Cimpian,	  in	  press).	  Children	  could	  indicate	  their	  answer	  choice	  either	  verbally	  or	  
non-­‐verbally,	  by	  pointing	  to	  a	  body	  part	  (see	  Cimpian	  &	  Park,	  2014,	  for	  a	  previous	  use	  of	  this	  
procedure).	  Overall,	  the	  greater	  the	  inherence	  bias	  in	  children’s	  explanations,	  the	  more	  they	  
should	  think	  that	  the	  phenomena	  being	  explained	  are	  temporally	  stable	  and	  inalterable.	  	  
The	  questions	  above	  were	  asked	  about	  two	  facts	  (that	  birthday	  cakes	  have	  candles,	  and	  
that	  coins	  are	  round);	  these	  facts	  were	  different	  than	  those	  used	  for	  the	  Is–Ought	  measure.	  
Both	  question	  order	  and	  fact	  order	  were	  counterbalanced	  across	  children.	  Children’s	  answers	  
to	  these	  questions	  (averaged	  across	  the	  two	  facts)	  were	  converted	  to	  a	  common	  0–1	  scale,	  with	  
higher	  scores	  indicating	  a	  stronger	  inherence	  bias,	  and	  then	  averaged	  into	  a	  composite	  (α	  =	  .60;	  
lowest	  item-­‐total	  correlation	  =	  .55;	  M	  =	  .51,	  SD	  =	  .24).	  
	   Control	  measures.	  Our	  analyses	  included	  two	  control	  measures.	  First,	  we	  adjusted	  for	  
children’s	  chronological	  age.	  The	  inherence	  bias	  in	  explanation	  declines	  somewhat	  with	  age	  
(Cimpian	  &	  Steinberg,	  2014),	  and	  if	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  is–ought	  inferences,	  then	  these	  two	  
variables	  could	  correlate	  coincidentally,	  just	  because	  they	  both	  happen	  to	  decline	  with	  age.	  
Partialling	  out	  children’s	  age	  also	  serves	  to	  minimize	  the	  potential	  influence	  of	  other	  variables	  
that	  change	  with	  development	  (e.g.,	  working	  memory,	  inhibitory	  control).	  Second,	  since	  young	  
children	  may	  be	  prone	  to	  say	  “yes”	  to	  complex	  questions	  of	  the	  sort	  we	  were	  asking,	  we	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included	  a	  measure	  of	  “yes”	  bias.	  Specifically,	  we	  embedded	  in	  the	  Is–Ought	  measure	  a	  
question	  about	  whether	  the	  relevant	  patterns	  (e.g.,	  money	  being	  green)	  were	  “interesting.”	  
This	  question	  should	  be	  fairly	  opaque	  to	  4-­‐	  to	  7-­‐year-­‐olds,	  so	  it	  should	  capture	  a	  tendency	  to	  
say	  “yes”	  when	  unsure	  of	  an	  answer.	  (Note,	  however,	  that	  several	  of	  the	  questions	  in	  the	  Is–
Ought	  and	  Inherent	  Explanations	  measures	  were	  reverse-­‐coded;	  thus,	  a	  “yes”	  bias	  would	  be	  an	  
unlikely	  alternative	  for	  the	  predicted	  correlation	  even	  if	  we	  didn’t	  adjust	  for	  it.)	  	  
3.2	  Results	  
	   Just	  as	  we	  found	  for	  the	  adults	  in	  Study	  1,	  children	  with	  higher	  scores	  on	  the	  Inherent	  
Explanations	  measures	  were	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  infer	  ought	  from	  is,	  r(78)	  =	  .45	  [.26,	  .61],	  p	  <	  
.001.	  Moreover,	  this	  relationship	  was	  not	  due	  to	  coincidental	  changes	  with	  age	  or	  to	  a	  “yes”	  
bias:	  Evidence	  for	  it	  was	  also	  found	  in	  a	  regression	  analysis	  that	  accounted	  for	  these	  two	  
alternatives,	  β	  =	  .43	  [.21,	  .65],	  p	  <	  .001	  (see	  Table	  3	  for	  full	  regression	  results).	  These	  results	  also	  
replicated	  (ps	  ≤	  .024)	  when	  we	  used	  a	  narrower	  measure	  of	  children’s	  explanations—namely,	  
just	  the	  item	  that	  assessed	  their	  agreement	  with	  inherent	  explanations.	  
	   Thus,	  the	  tendency	  to	  explain	  the	  world	  in	  inherent	  terms	  and	  the	  tendency	  to	  derive	  
ought	  from	  is	  appear	  to	  be	  linked	  even	  among	  preschoolers.	  The	  last	  two	  studies	  tested	  
whether	  this	  link	  is	  causal	  by	  manipulating	  adults’	  (Study	  3)	  and	  children’s	  (Study	  4)	  
explanations	  and	  measuring	  subsequent	  changes	  in	  their	  is–ought	  reasoning.	  





	   Participants.	  The	  participants	  were	  267	  adults	  (Mage	  =	  30.5,	  SD	  =	  12.9;	  108	  men,	  158	  
women,	  1	  did	  not	  report	  gender)	  from	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk	  service	  or	  a	  university	  subject	  
pool.	  Participants	  were	  compensated	  with	  $0.75	  or	  course	  credit,	  respectively.	  An	  additional	  26	  
subjects	  were	  tested	  but	  excluded	  from	  the	  final	  sample	  because	  their	  IP	  addresses	  were	  from	  
outside	  the	  US	  (n	  =	  3),	  because	  they	  failed	  our	  catch	  items	  (n	  =	  21),	  or	  because	  they	  indicated	  
during	  debriefing	  that	  they	  had	  not	  paid	  attention	  (n	  =	  2).	  	  
	   Manipulation.	  We	  used	  a	  manipulation	  that	  has	  previously	  been	  found	  to	  lower	  the	  
inherence	  bias	  in	  participants’	  explanations	  (Salomon	  &	  Cimpian,	  2014).	  This	  manipulation	  
consisted	  of	  a	  10-­‐item	  “scale”	  whose	  purpose	  was	  not	  to	  assess	  some	  construct	  or	  other	  but	  
rather	  to	  temporarily	  alter	  participants’	  habitual	  thinking	  patterns	  (e.g.,	  Bryan,	  Dweck,	  Ross,	  
Kay	  &	  Mislavsky,	  2009).	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  either	  an	  Anti-­‐Inherence	  (n	  =	  
132)	  or	  a	  Control	  (n	  =	  135)	  condition.	  The	  mock	  scale	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐Inherence	  condition	  was	  
designed	  to	  influence	  participants’	  explanatory	  intuitions	  by	  exposing	  them	  to	  strongly	  worded	  
extrinsic	  explanations	  (e.g.,	  “We	  give	  flowers	  as	  gifts	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  occasions	  [e.g.,	  Valentine’s	  
Day,	  funerals]	  because	  of	  effective	  advertising	  and	  marketing	  by	  florists—not	  because	  flowers	  
effectively	  convey	  a	  variety	  of	  sentiments”	  or	  “The	  only	  reason	  our	  paper,	  money,	  and	  books	  
are	  rectangular	  is	  historical	  happenstance”).	  To	  maximize	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  extrinsic	  
primes,	  we	  also	  used	  response	  scales	  that	  were	  skewed	  toward	  agreement	  (1	  =	  “disagree,”	  2	  =	  
“agree	  somewhat,”	  3	  =	  “agree,”	  and	  4	  =	  “agree	  very	  strongly”).	  The	  mock	  scale	  in	  the	  Control	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condition	  was	  matched	  in	  content	  but	  did	  not	  contain	  any	  explanations	  (e.g.,	  “People	  often	  give	  
flowers	  as	  gifts	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  occasions	  [e.g.,	  Valentine’s	  Day,	  funerals]”	  or	  “Most	  
books,	  paper,	  and	  money	  are	  rectangular	  in	  shape”).	  
Procedure	  and	  Materials.	  Following	  the	  manipulation,	  participants	  completed	  a	  brief	  
distractor	  task	  (“Where’s	  Waldo?”).	  They	  then	  filled	  out	  two	  measures,	  in	  randomized	  order:	  (1)	  
a	  check	  for	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  manipulation	  (the	  Inherence	  Heuristic	  Scale;	  Salomon	  &	  
Cimpian,	  2014),	  and	  (2)	  an	  Is–Ought	  measure,	  which	  was	  the	  same	  as	  in	  Study	  1	  (α	  =	  .63;	  lowest	  
item-­‐total	  correlation	  =	  .46).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  study,	  participants	  completed	  a	  demographics	  
questionnaire	  and	  a	  debriefing.	  	  
4.2	  Results	  
	   We	  predicted	  that	  our	  scale	  manipulation	  would	  lower	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  participants’	  
explanations	  are	  inherence-­‐biased,	  and	  in	  turn	  the	  likelihood	  that	  they	  would	  make	  is–ought	  
inferences.	  	   	   	  
Manipulation	  Check.	  Participants	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐Inherence	  condition	  (M	  =	  5.64,	  SD	  =	  1.23)	  
had	  lower	  scores	  on	  the	  Inherence	  Heuristic	  Scale	  than	  those	  in	  the	  Control	  condition	  (M	  =	  
6.28,	  SD	  =	  1.18),	  t(265)	  =	  4.29,	  p	  <	  .001,	  d	  =	  .53.	  Thus,	  our	  manipulation	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  
effective	  in	  counteracting	  the	  inherence	  bias	  in	  participants’	  explanatory	  intuitions.	  	  
Effect	  on	  Is–Ought	  Inferences.	  Consistent	  with	  our	  main	  prediction,	  participants	  in	  the	  
Anti-­‐Inherence	  condition	  (M	  =	  5.45,	  SD	  =	  1.15)	  also	  had	  lower	  scores	  on	  the	  Is–Ought	  measure	  
than	  those	  in	  the	  Control	  condition	  (M	  =	  5.78,	  SD	  =	  1.19),	  t(265)=	  2.24,	  p	  =	  .026,	  d	  =	  .27.	  Next,	  
we	  tested	  whether	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  manipulation	  on	  participants’	  is–ought	  reasoning	  was	  
mediated	  by	  its	  effect	  on	  their	  explanations.	  Indeed,	  this	  indirect	  effect	  was	  significant	  in	  a	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bootstrapped	  product-­‐of-­‐coefficients	  mediation	  analysis,	  ab	  =	  −.07	  [−.12,	  −.03],	  SE	  =	  .02	  (see	  
Figure	  1).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Anti-­‐Inherence	  participants’	  weaker	  is–ought	  inferences	  were	  due	  
in	  part	  to	  their	  diminished	  preference	  for	  inherent	  explanations.	  
Conclusion.	  In	  support	  of	  our	  causal	  claims,	  experimentally	  lowering	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  
participants	  relied	  on	  inherent	  facts	  in	  their	  explanations	  also	  lowered	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  
drew	  inferences	  about	  how	  things	  should	  be	  based	  on	  how	  they	  are.	  In	  the	  last	  study,	  we	  
tested	  this	  causal	  link	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  4-­‐	  to	  7-­‐year-­‐old	  children.	  





Participants.	  The	  participants	  were	  48	  children	  aged	  between	  4	  and	  7	  (Mage	  =	  6.07,	  SD	  =	  
1.21;	  24	  girls	  and	  24	  boys)	  who	  were	  recruited	  from	  a	  small	  city	  in	  the	  Midwestern	  United	  
States.	  The	  children	  were	  demographically	  similar	  to	  those	  in	  Study	  2.	  Seventeen	  additional	  
children	  were	  tested	  but	  excluded	  from	  the	  final	  sample	  because	  they	  refused	  to	  complete	  the	  
study	  (n	  =	  6)	  or	  because	  they	  failed	  a	  comprehension	  check	  (n	  =	  11;	  see	  below).	  	  
	   Manipulation.	  For	  a	  precise	  test	  of	  the	  causal	  link	  between	  explanation	  and	  is–ought	  
inferences,	  in	  Study	  4	  we	  manipulated	  how	  children	  explained	  the	  very	  same	  facts	  about	  which	  
we	  later	  asked	  them	  is–ought	  questions.	  (By	  comparison,	  the	  manipulation	  in	  the	  previous	  
study	  was	  aimed	  at	  inherent	  explanations	  more	  globally.)	  For	  each	  of	  six	  familiar	  facts	  (e.g.,	  that	  
brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings),	  we	  first	  provided	  children	  with	  either	  an	  inherent	  or	  an	  
extrinsic	  explanation.	  The	  inherent	  explanations	  appealed	  to	  the	  inherent	  features	  of	  the	  
entities	  in	  the	  explanandum	  (e.g.,	  white	  is	  really	  bright),	  whereas	  the	  extrinsic	  explanations	  
appealed	  to	  historical	  events	  and	  processes	  (e.g.,	  an	  important	  queen	  wore	  white	  at	  her	  
wedding,	  so	  then	  everyone	  started	  doing	  it;	  see	  the	  Appendix	  for	  full	  text).	  This	  manipulation	  
was	  within-­‐subject:	  three	  facts	  received	  an	  inherent	  explanation,	  and	  three	  an	  extrinsic	  
explanation.	  The	  three	  explanations	  of	  the	  same	  type	  were	  presented	  as	  a	  block,	  and	  the	  order	  
of	  the	  inherent	  and	  extrinsic	  blocks	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  children.	  
Main	  Measures.	  Following	  each	  explanation,	  children	  were	  asked	  the	  following	  
questions,	  in	  counterbalanced	  order:	  (1)	  the	  is–ought	  questions	  from	  Study	  2	  (Is	  it	  good	  that	  …?	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Is	  it	  the	  way	  things	  should	  be?	  Would	  it	  be	  bad	  if	  things	  were	  different?;	  α	  =	  .58;	  lowest	  item-­‐
total	  correlation	  =	  .59),	  and	  (2)	  the	  inalterability	  question	  from	  Study	  2	  (If	  everyone	  agrees,	  can	  
it	  be	  changed?),	  which	  served	  as	  a	  brief	  manipulation	  check.	  Before	  each	  of	  these	  questions,	  
the	  experimenter	  reminded	  children	  of	  the	  relevant	  (inherent	  or	  extrinsic)	  explanation.	  
Attention/Comprehension	  Checks.	  To	  check	  that	  children	  were	  paying	  attention	  and	  
understanding	  the	  explanations,	  the	  experimenter	  asked	  them	  to	  recall	  the	  explanations	  (1)	  
immediately	  after	  hearing	  them,	  and	  (2)	  after	  answering	  the	  is-­‐ought	  and	  inalterability	  
questions.	  If	  a	  child	  could	  not	  repeat	  back	  the	  explanation	  right	  after	  hearing	  it,	  the	  
experimenter	  read	  it	  again.	  If	  a	  child	  could	  not	  recall	  any	  portion	  of	  the	  explanation	  after	  three	  
prompts	  by	  the	  experimenter,	  the	  child	  was	  excluded	  from	  the	  sample	  (n	  =	  11).	  	  
Control	  Measures.	  As	  before,	  our	  analyses	  adjusted	  for	  participants’	  chronological	  age.	  
In	  addition,	  Study	  4	  included	  a	  “shallow	  cues”	  control	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  inherent	  
vs.	  extrinsic	  manipulation	  might	  be	  due	  not	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  inherence	  of	  the	  explanations	  
per	  se	  but	  to	  more	  superficial	  aspects	  of	  their	  content	  or	  wording	  (e.g.,	  positive	  or	  negative	  
associations	  children	  might	  have	  with	  particular	  phrases).	  To	  capture	  responses	  based	  on	  such	  
shallow	  cues	  to	  positivity	  vs.	  negativity,	  we	  asked	  children	  to	  rate	  how	  “fun”	  they	  thought	  each	  
fact	  was	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  (“really	  not	  fun”)	  to	  6	  (“really	  fun”).	  These	  questions	  were	  asked	  at	  
the	  very	  end	  of	  the	  sessions,	  and	  children	  were	  briefly	  reminded	  of	  the	  relevant	  explanation	  for	  
each	  fact	  before	  answering	  the	  “fun”	  question.	  This	  question	  was	  administered	  to	  a	  random	  
subset	  of	  children	  (n	  =	  22;	  Mage	  =	  5.88,	  SD	  =	  1.08).	  	  
5.2	  Results	  
We	  predicted	  that	  extrinsic	  (vs.	  inherent)	  explanations	  would	  lead	  children	  to	  view	  the	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facts	  being	  explained	  as	  less	  necessary	  and	  inalterable,	  which	  would	  in	  turn	  weaken	  children’s	  
tendency	  to	  make	  is–ought	  inferences.	  	  
Manipulation	  Check.	  Children	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  judge	  the	  facts	  as	  inalterable	  when	  
they	  heard	  extrinsic	  explanations	  (M	  =	  .44,	  SD	  =	  .37)	  than	  when	  they	  heard	  inherent	  
explanations	  (M	  =	  .54,	  SD	  =	  .42),	  t(47)	  =	  2.21,	  p	  =	  .032,	  d	  =	  .25.	  This	  difference	  also	  held	  up	  
when	  we	  adjusted	  for	  children’s	  chronological	  age	  in	  a	  multilevel	  model	  with	  random	  intercepts	  
for	  subjects	  and	  items,	  β	  =	  −.10	  [−.18,	  −.03],	  p	  =	  .009.	  (The	  multilevel	  model	  was	  necessitated	  by	  
the	  repeated-­‐measures	  nature	  of	  the	  data.)	  Further,	  adjusting	  for	  both	  age	  and	  the	  “shallow	  
cues”	  control	  in	  the	  subsample	  of	  children	  who	  received	  this	  question	  led	  to	  the	  same	  
conclusion,	  β	  =	  −.12	  [−.23,	  −.01],	  p	  =	  .036.	  These	  two	  models	  also	  revealed	  that	  children’s	  
intuitions	  about	  the	  immutability	  of	  observed	  facts	  decreased	  with	  age,	  βs	  =	  −.40	  [−.59,	  −.21]	  
and	  −.52	  [−.72,	  −.31],	  ps	  <	  .001,	  respectively,	  which	  replicates	  prior	  work	  (Cimpian	  &	  Steinberg,	  
2014).	  	  
Effect	  on	  Is–Ought	  Inferences.	  As	  predicted,	  the	  manipulation	  also	  affected	  children’s	  
is–ought	  inferences:	  These	  inferences	  were	  weaker	  for	  facts	  explained	  extrinsically	  (M	  =	  .66,	  SD	  
=	  .26)	  than	  for	  facts	  explained	  inherently	  (M	  =	  .74,	  SD	  =	  .21),	  t(47)	  =	  2.71,	  p	  =	  .009,	  d	  =	  .36.	  This	  
extrinsic	  vs.	  inherent	  difference	  remained	  significant	  when	  adjusting	  for	  children’s	  age	  (in	  the	  
full	  sample),	  β	  =	  −.15	  [−.24,	  −.06],	  p	  =	  .001,	  and	  when	  jointly	  adjusting	  for	  children’s	  age	  and	  the	  
“shallow	  cues”	  control	  (in	  the	  relevant	  subsample),	  β	  =	  −.13	  [−.25,	  −.002],	  p	  =	  .046.	  It	  is	  also	  
interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  children’s	  is–ought	  inferences	  declined	  with	  age	  as	  well,	  
βs	  =	  −.28	  [−.46,	  −.09]	  and	  −.32	  [−.55,	  −.07],	  ps	  ≤	  .010,	  in	  the	  two	  models	  above,	  respectively.	  
Finally,	  we	  tested	  whether	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  explanation	  manipulation	  on	  children’s	  is–
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ought	  inferences	  was	  mediated	  by	  its	  effect	  on	  their	  intuitions	  about	  the	  necessity	  (vs.	  
contingency)	  of	  the	  facts	  being	  explained.	  A	  bootstrapped	  product-­‐of-­‐coefficients	  multilevel	  
mediation	  model,	  which	  also	  included	  children’s	  age	  as	  a	  covariate,	  found	  evidence	  for	  the	  
predicted	  indirect	  effect,	  ab	  =	  −.06	  [−.12,	  −.01],	  SE	  =	  .03	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  This	  indirect	  effect	  
remained	  significant	  when	  adding	  the	  “shallow	  cues”	  control	  as	  a	  covariate	  to	  the	  model,	  ab	  =	  
−.05	  [−.13,	  −.01],	  SE	  =	  .03.	  Thus,	  extrinsic	  explanations	  weaken	  children’s	  is–ought	  inferences	  in	  
part	  because	  they	  also	  weaken	  children’s	  tendency	  to	  view	  the	  explananda	  as	  necessary	  and	  
immutable.	  
Conclusion.	  We	  found	  that	  inherent	  (vs.	  extrinsic)	  explanations	  lead	  children	  to	  imbue	  
reality	  with	  value.	  Given	  that	  children’s	  explanations	  exhibit	  a	  strong	  inherence	  bias	  (e.g.,	  
Cimpian	  &	  Steinberg,	  2014),	  these	  results	  suggest	  that	  explanatory	  biases	  might	  play	  an	  
important	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  children’s	  sociomoral	  reasoning,	  leading	  them	  to	  attach	  




	   We	  proposed	  that	  the	  inherence	  bias	  in	  everyday	  explanations	  (e.g.,	  Cimpian	  &	  
Salomon,	  2014a,b)	  leads	  people	  to	  view	  what	  is	  typical	  as	  also	  being	  good	  and	  desirable.	  Four	  
studies	  provided	  correlational	  and	  experimental	  evidence	  for	  this	  proposal	  in	  participants	  
spanning	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  development.	  These	  results	  provide	  new	  mechanistic	  insight	  into	  the	  
common	  tendency	  to	  reason	  from	  is	  to	  ought,	  and	  they	  also	  identify	  a	  new,	  independent	  source	  
of	  sociomoral	  value.	  
	   This	  work	  connects	  in	  potentially	  fruitful	  ways	  with	  other	  research	  in	  moral	  psychology.	  
For	  instance,	  our	  studies	  suggest	  that	  people	  seem	  to	  move	  seamlessly	  from	  factual	  to	  value-­‐
based	  judgments,	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  other	  studies	  that	  have	  found	  continuity	  between	  
moral	  and	  nonmoral	  considerations	  in	  everyday	  reasoning	  (e.g.,	  Cushman	  &	  Young,	  2011;	  
Knobe,	  2010).	  Attending	  to	  the	  early-­‐emerging	  link	  between	  explanatory	  biases	  and	  sociomoral	  
judgments	  may	  also	  suggest	  answers	  to	  open	  questions	  in	  the	  developmental	  literature.	  We	  
might	  predict,	  for	  example,	  that	  individual	  differences	  in	  children’s	  inherence	  bias	  could	  help	  
explain	  individual	  differences	  in	  drawing	  social-­‐conventional	  vs.	  moral	  distinctions	  (e.g.,	  
Smetana	  et	  al.,	  2012):	  The	  stronger	  this	  bias,	  the	  more	  likely	  children	  might	  be	  to	  imbue	  even	  
social-­‐conventional	  regularities	  with	  quasi-­‐moral	  force.	  In	  adults,	  individual	  differences	  in	  
reliance	  on	  inherent	  explanations	  could	  also	  be	  part	  of	  the	  reason	  why	  some	  assign	  more	  value	  
than	  others	  to	  tradition	  and	  custom	  (e.g.,	  Eidelman	  &	  Crandall,	  2014),	  and—relatedly—why	  
issues	  of	  loyalty	  and	  respect	  for	  authority	  are	  central	  to	  sociomoral	  judgment	  for	  some	  more	  
than	  others	  (e.g.,	  Graham	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Such	  areas	  of	  overlap	  and	  cross-­‐fertilization	  further	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highlight	  the	  theoretical	  contribution	  of	  these	  studies.	  	  
To	  conclude,	  the	  present	  research	  uncovers	  the	  psychological	  origins	  of	  a	  common	  
judgment	  pattern	  that	  informs	  our	  evaluations	  of	  what	  is	  good	  and	  worthy,	  and	  that	  has	  been	  a	  
central	  issue	  in	  moral	  philosophy	  since	  Hume	  (1740/2000).	  According	  to	  our	  evidence,	  the	  
tendency	  to	  assign	  value	  to	  what	  is	  typical	  is	  due	  in	  part	  to	  a	  systematic	  bias	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
explanation.	  Given	  that	  explanations	  fundamentally	  determine	  how	  we	  understand	  the	  world	  
we	  inhabit,	  the	  influence	  of	  a	  bias	  in	  these	  judgments	  on	  our	  sociomoral	  evaluations	  may	  be	  
substantial.	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Tables	  and	  Figures	  
Table	  1	  
Sample	  Items	  from	  the	  Inherent	  Explanations	  Measure	  Used	  in	  Study	  1	  	  
Sample	  Item	  
	  
We	  use	  red	  in	  traffic	  lights	  to	  mean	  “stop”	  because	  of	  something	  about	  the	  color	  red	  or	  
about	  stop	  lights—maybe	  the	  color	  red	  inherently	  acts	  as	  a	  warning.	  
We	  don’t	  keep	  chipmunks	  as	  pets	  because	  of	  something	  about	  chipmunks	  or	  about	  
pets—maybe	  because	  chipmunks	  don’t	  like	  to	  be	  picked	  up	  or	  held.	  
We	  drink	  orange	  juice	  for	  breakfast	  because	  of	  something	  about	  orange	  juice	  or	  about	  
breakfast—maybe	  the	  citrus	  aroma	  is	  refreshing	  and	  helps	  us	  to	  wake	  up.	  
Toothpaste	  is	  flavored	  with	  mint	  because	  of	  something	  about	  toothpaste	  or	  about	  
mint—maybe	  the	  tingling	  sensation	  of	  mint	  makes	  one’s	  teeth	  and	  gums	  feel	  extra	  
clean.	  
Dollar	  bills	  are	  green	  because	  of	  something	  about	  dollar	  bills	  or	  about	  the	  color	  
green—maybe	  since	  green	  is	  the	  color	  of	  trees	  it	  symbolizes	  endurance	  and	  trust	  and	  
thus	  was	  chosen	  for	  money.	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Table	  2	  
Multiple	  Regression	  Analysis	  Predicting	  Is–Ought	  Inferences	  from	  the	  Inherent	  Explanations	  
Measure	  and	  the	  Control	  Variables	  in	  Study	  1	  	  
	   Predictor	   	   β	   	   t	   	   p	  
	   	   	   	  
	   Inherent	  Explanations	   .31**	   3.27	   .001	  
	   Education	  Level	   –.07	   –.80	   .425	  
	   Raven’s	  Progressive	  Matrices	   –.02	   –.24	   .807	  
	   Conservatism	   .10	   1.14	   .258	  
Belief	  in	  a	  Just	  World	   –.09	   –.93	   .357	  
	   R2	  total	   11.3%	   	   	  
	   F	   2.96*	   	   	  
	   N	   122	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  *	  p	  <	  .05.	  **	  p	  <	  .01.	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Table	  3	  
Multiple	  Regression	  Analysis	  Predicting	  Children’s	  Is–Ought	  Inferences	  from	  the	  Inherent	  
Explanations	  Measure	  and	  the	  Control	  Variables	  in	  Study	  2	  	  
	   Predictor	   	   β	   	   t	   	   p	  
	   	   	   	  
	   Inherent	  Explanations	   .43***	   3.91	   <.001	  
	   Chronological	  Age	   .04	   .38	   .708	  
	   “Yes”	  Bias	  Control	   .14	   1.30	   .196	  
	   R2	  total	   22.3%	   	   	  
	   F	   7.26***	   	   	  
	   N	   80	   	   	  
	   	   	   	  ***	  p	  <	  .001.	  
	  








Figure	  1.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  experimental	  manipulation	  on	  participants’	  is–ought	  
reasoning	  was	  mediated	  by	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  inherence	  bias	  in	  their	  explanations	  
(Study	  3).	  The	  figure	  depicts	  standardized	  coefficients.	  	  **p	  <	  .01.	  ***p	  <	  .001	  
	  
	   	  
Manipulation 








a = −.26*** b = .27*** 








Figure	  2.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  inherent	  vs.	  extrinsic	  manipulation	  on	  children’s	  is–ought	  
reasoning	  was	  mediated	  by	  its	  effect	  on	  their	  intuitions	  about	  necessity	  and	  
inalterability	  (Study	  4).	  The	  model	  included	  children’s	  age	  as	  a	  covariate.	  The	  figure	  
depicts	  standardized	  coefficients.	  *p	  <	  .05.	  **p	  <	  .01.	  ***p	  <	  .001.	  
	  
	  
	   	  
Manipulation 
(0 = Inherent;  






a = −.11** b = .55*** 
Indirect effect: ab = −.06* 
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Appendix	  
Stimuli	  and	  Materials	  
-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐   




PRESS	  RELEASE:	  NCA	  RELEASES	  2013	  COFFEE	  CONSUMPTION	  DATA	  
Coffee	  Consumption	  Jumps	  by	  5%,	  83%	  of	  Americans	  Say	  They	  Drink	  Coffee	  
	  
San	  Francisco,	  CA	  (March	  22,	  2013)	  -­‐	  Overall	  coffee	  consumption	  jumped	  by	  five	  percentage	  points	  this	  year,	  
according	  to	  the	  NCA	  National	  Coffee	  Drinking	  Trends	  (NCDT)	  market	  research	  study.	  With	  this	  increase,	  83%	  of	  
the	  U.S.	  adult	  population	  now	  drinks	  coffee.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  daily	  consumption	  remained	  strong	  and	  steady	  at	  
63%,	  while	  those	  who	  drink	  coffee	  at	  least	  once	  per	  week	  was	  up	  slightly	  to	  75%.	  	  	  	  In	  other	  NCDT	  data,	  the	  single-­‐
cup	  brewing	  format	  continues	  to	  grow	  steadily:	  13%	  of	  the	  U.S.	  population	  drank	  a	  coffee	  made	  in	  a	  single-­‐cup	  
brewer	  yesterday.	  This	  is	  up	  from	  just	  4%	  in	  2010.	  By	  contrast,	  past-­‐day	  consumption	  of	  a	  coffee	  made	  in	  a	  drip	  
coffee	  maker	  has	  dropped	  to	  37%	  from	  43%	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  Awareness	  of	  single-­‐cup	  brewers	  reached	  82%,	  
up	  by	  11	  points	  from	  last	  year,	  while	  ownership	  has	  grown	  to	  12%	  from	  10%	  last	  year.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Target	  question:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  that	  it's	  good	  that	  so	  many	  Americans	  drink	  coffee?	  
	  
Filler	  questions:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  the	  single	  cup	  brewing	  format	  is	  going	  to	  grow	  in	  the	  future?	  
-­‐	  What	  do	  you	  think	  accounts	  for	  the	  success	  of	  the	  single	  cup	  brew?	  
-­‐	  How	  far	  back	  do	  you	  think	  data	  has	  been	  collected	  on	  coffee	  consumption	  in	  the	  United	  States?	  




America's	  pizza	  obsession:	  By	  the	  numbers	  
U.S.	  pizza	  vendors	  sell	  the	  equivalent	  of	  10	  pies	  a	  year	  to	  every	  single	  man,	  woman,	  and	  child	  in	  the	  country	  	  
By	  The	  Week	  Staff	  |	  June	  22,	  2011	  
	  
The	  quintessential	  American	  food	  may	  be	  apple	  pie,	  but	  its	  popularity	  pales	  beside	  our	  national	  love	  affair	  with	  
pizza	  pies.	  The	  Daily	  reports	  that	  Americans	  consume	  a	  staggering	  100	  acres	  of	  pizza	  a	  day,	  according	  to	  data	  from	  
the	  National	  Association	  of	  Pizza	  Operators	  (NAPO).	  Over	  $38	  billion	  of	  pizza	  is	  sold	  in	  America	  annually,	  according	  
to	  Pizza	  Today,	  and	  3	  billion	  pizzas	  are	  sold	  in	  the	  U.S.	  each	  year	  according	  to	  NAPO.	  350	  slices	  of	  pizza	  sold	  every	  
second,	  according	  to	  NAPO,	  and	  the	  average	  American	  eats	  an	  average	  of	  46	  slices	  of	  pizza	  year,	  according	  to	  
Packaged	  Facts.	  Overall,	  a	  total	  of	  94%	  of	  Americans	  eat	  pizza.	  	  
	  
Target	  question:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  it	  should	  be	  that	  so	  many	  Americans	  eat	  pizza?	  
	  
Filler	  questions:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  the	  amount	  of	  pizza	  sold	  will	  grow	  in	  the	  next	  5	  years?	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-­‐	  What	  do	  you	  think	  accounts	  for	  the	  current	  prices	  of	  pizza?	  
-­‐	  How	  far	  back	  do	  you	  think	  data	  has	  been	  collected	  on	  pizza	  consumption	  in	  the	  United	  States?	  




No	  Surprise:	  64%	  of	  Americans	  Watch	  NFL	  Football;	  73%	  of	  Men,	  55%	  of	  Women	  
Written	  By	  Bill	  Gorman	  
NEW	  YORK,	  Oct.	  14,	  2011	  	  
	  
/PRNewswire/	  -­‐-­‐	  Football	  Night	  in	  America	  seems,	  at	  first,	  to	  be	  a	  presumptuous	  name	  for	  NBC	  to	  call	  their	  
pre-­‐game	  television	  program.	  
However,	  according	  to	  the	  results	  of	  a	  recent	  Adweek/Harris	  Poll	  the	  name	  is	  accurate	  as	  almost	  two	  thirds	  of	  U.S.	  
adults	  say	  they	  currently	  watch	  NFL	  football	  (64%),	  including	  almost	  three	  quarters	  of	  men	  (73%)	  and	  over	  half	  of	  
women	  (55%).	  These	  are	  some	  of	  the	  findings	  of	  a	  recent	  Adweek/Harris	  Poll	  survey	  of	  2,374	  U.S.	  adults	  surveyed	  
online	  between	  September	  9	  and	  13,	  2011	  by	  Harris	  Interactive.	  Despite	  all	  of	  the	  technology	  devices	  that	  
Americans	  have	  come	  to	  use	  and	  rely	  on,	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  U.S.	  adults	  say	  that	  they	  watch	  NFL	  football	  on	  their	  
television	  (60%)	  while	  fewer	  than	  one	  in	  ten	  say	  they	  watch	  on	  a	  desktop	  or	  laptop	  computer	  (8%),	  smart-­‐phone	  
(3%)	  or	  tablet	  computer	  (2%).	  Only	  6%	  say	  they	  watch	  games	  live,	  as	  in	  they	  attend	  the	  games	  in	  person.	  	  
	  
Target	  question:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  that	  it's	  good	  that	  so	  many	  Americans	  watch	  football?	  
	  
Filler	  questions:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  the	  number	  of	  viewers	  who	  watch	  the	  games	  live	  will	  stay	  at	  around	  6%	  over	  the	  next	  5	  years?	  
-­‐	  What	  do	  you	  think	  accounts	  for	  why	  only	  6%	  of	  football	  viewers	  watch	  the	  games	  live	  (that	  is,	  in	  person)?	  
-­‐	  How	  far	  back	  do	  you	  think	  data	  has	  been	  collected	  on	  football	  viewership	  in	  the	  United	  States?	  




Americans	  still	  love	  to	  drive	  to	  work	  
June	  13	  2007,	  5:04	  PM	  EDT	  
	  
An	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  Americans	  skip	  the	  bus	  or	  forgo	  carpooling,	  choosing	  instead	  to	  drive	  to	  work,	  
according	  to	  a	  government	  study	  published	  Wednesday.	  Nearly	  9	  out	  of	  10	  workers	  commuted	  to	  work	  by	  car	  in	  
2005,	  the	  Census	  Bureau	  revealed	  in	  its	  "American	  Community	  Survey".	  Today,	  a	  total	  of	  88%	  of	  Americans	  drive	  
to	  work.	  Conversely,	  only	  4.7	  percent	  of	  workers	  used	  public	  transportation	  to	  get	  to	  work,	  the	  survey	  found,	  with	  
half	  of	  those	  workers	  found	  in	  the	  nation's	  largest	  cities	  like	  Boston,	  San	  Francisco,	  New	  York,	  Houston	  and	  Seattle.	  	  
The	  Census	  Bureau	  study	  also	  revealed	  other	  interesting	  trends	  in	  Americans'	  commuting	  habits.	  Just	  1	  in	  10	  
commuters	  carpooled	  to	  work,	  usually	  driving	  with	  just	  one	  other	  person	  in	  the	  car,	  according	  to	  the	  study.	  
Portland,	  Ore.,	  had	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  commuters	  who	  bicycled	  to	  work,	  with	  3.5	  percent	  of	  its	  workforce	  
pedaling	  to	  work.	  As	  a	  nation,	  just	  0.4	  percent	  of	  the	  American	  workforce	  rode	  their	  bike	  to	  work	  in	  2005.	  	  
	  
Target	  question:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  that	  it's	  good	  that	  so	  many	  Americans	  drive	  to	  work?	  
	  
Filler	  questions:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  who	  ride	  their	  bikes	  to	  work	  will	  continue	  to	  stay	  low	  over	  the	  next	  5	  
years?	  
-­‐	  What	  do	  you	  think	  accounts	  for	  why	  so	  few	  Americans	  ride	  their	  bikes	  to	  work?	  
-­‐	  How	  far	  back	  do	  you	  think	  data	  has	  been	  collected	  on	  driving	  rates	  in	  the	  United	  States?	  





Americans	  Watching	  More	  TV	  Than	  Ever	  
By	  Swanni	  
	  
Washington,	  D.C.	  (March	  20,	  2013)	  -­‐	  The	  average	  American	  is	  now	  watching	  23	  hours	  of	  TV	  shows	  every	  week,	  
compared	  to	  21	  hours	  in	  2011	  and	  19	  hours	  in	  2010,	  according	  to	  a	  new	  study	  from	  Motorola	  Mobility.	  In	  addition,	  
U.S.	  viewers	  are	  watching	  six	  hours	  of	  movies	  every	  week.	  Motorola,	  which	  has	  measured	  media	  activity	  for	  
several	  years,	  says	  worldwide	  viewers	  watch	  an	  average	  of	  19	  hours	  of	  shows	  and	  movies	  a	  week,	  which	  is	  up	  from	  
10	  hours	  in	  2011.	  The	  study,	  which	  was	  based	  on	  surveys	  of	  9,500	  consumers	  in	  17	  countries,	  found	  that	  live	  TV	  
viewing	  is	  still	  king	  with	  73	  percent	  of	  survey	  participants	  saying	  they	  watch	  it	  when	  it	  airs.	  99	  %	  of	  American	  
households	  own	  a	  TV.	  But	  DVR	  owners	  watch	  an	  average	  of	  one	  hour	  more	  programming	  each	  week.	  The	  increase	  
in	  TV	  viewing	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  worldwide	  can	  be	  attributed	  at	  least	  in	  part	  to	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  available	  
devices	  and	  services	  that	  can	  display	  both	  live	  and	  recorded	  video.	  Viewers	  can	  now	  watch	  live	  and/or	  traditionally	  
scheduled	  programming	  on	  their	  big-­‐screen	  TVs;	  recorded	  shows	  from	  their	  DVRs;	  and	  both	  live	  and	  recorded	  
content	  from	  mobiles	  such	  as	  the	  iPad	  and	  iPhone.	  	  
	  
Target	  question:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  it	  should	  be	  that	  so	  many	  American	  households	  own	  a	  TV?	  
	  
Filler	  questions:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  the	  average	  number	  of	  shows	  and	  movies	  that	  Americans	  watch	  per	  week	  will	  continue	  to	  grow	  
over	  the	  next	  5	  years?	  
-­‐	  What	  do	  you	  think	  accounts	  for	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  available	  devices	  to	  watch	  videos?	  
-­‐	  How	  far	  back	  do	  you	  think	  data	  has	  been	  collected	  on	  TV	  viewing	  in	  the	  United	  States?	  




Search	  and	  email	  still	  top	  the	  list	  of	  most	  popular	  online	  activities	  
Aug	  9,	  2011	  	  
by	  Kristen	  Purcell	  
	  
A	  May	  2011	  Pew	   Internet	   survey	   finds	   that	   92%	  of	   online	   adults	   use	   search	  engines	   to	   find	   information	  on	   the	  
Web,	   including	  59%	  who	  do	  so	  on	  a	   typical	  day.	  This	  places	  search	  at	   the	   top	  of	   the	   list	  of	  most	  popular	  online	  
activities	  among	  U.S.	  adults.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  alone	  at	  the	  top.	  Among	  online	  adults,	  92%	  use	  email,	  with	  61%	  using	  it	  
on	  an	  average	  day.	  According	   to	   the	  Pew	   Internet	  Project,	   these	   two	  behaviors	  have	  consistently	   ranked	  as	   the	  
most	  popular	   in	   the	   last	  decade.	  Even	  as	  early	   as	  2002,	  more	   than	  eight	   in	   ten	  online	  adults	  were	  using	   search	  
engines,	   and	  more	   than	   nine	   in	   ten	   online	   adults	  were	   emailing.	   Of	   course,	   the	   internet	   population	   has	   grown	  
substantially	   since	   2002.	   So,	   the	   overall	   number	   of	   users	   of	   both	   email	   and	   search	   engines	   has	   also	   grown.	   In	  
January	  2002,	  52%	  of	  all	  Americans	  used	  search	  engines	  and	  that	  number	  grew	  to	  72%	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  survey.	  
In	  January	  2002,	  55%	  of	  all	  Americans	  said	  they	  used	  email	  and	  that	  number	  grew	  to	  70%	  in	  the	  current	  survey.	  	  
	  
Target	  question:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  it	  should	  be	  that	  so	  many	  Americans	  use	  email?	  
	  
Filler	  questions:	  
-­‐	  Do	  you	  think	  the	  overall	  population	  of	  internet	  users	  will	  continue	  to	  grow	  in	  the	  next	  5	  years?	  
-­‐	  What	  do	  you	  think	  accounts	  for	  the	  recent	  rise	  in	  the	  population	  of	  internet	  users?	  
-­‐	  How	  far	  back	  do	  you	  think	  data	  has	  been	  collected	  on	  email	  and	  internet	  search	  use	  in	  the	  United	  States?	  
-­‐	  What	  are	  your	  email	  and	  internet	  search	  habits?	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STUDIES	  2	  &	  4	  (CHILDREN)	  
IS-­‐OUGHT	  MEASURE	  &	  CONTROL	  QUESTIONS	  
Is–Ought	  Questions	  (Studies	  2	  &	  4)	  (using	  the	  “brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings”	  fact)	  
	  
Question	  1:	  Do	  you	  think	  it	  is	  good	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings,	  and	  not	  a	  different	  color,	  like	  
yellow?	  Do	  you	  think	  it’s	  good	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings?	  
If	  child	  said	  “yes”:	  Do	  you	  think	  it’s	  sort	  of	  good,	  good,	  or	  really	  good	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings?1	  
Scoring:	  4-­‐point	  scale	  (1	  =	  “no”	  to	  4	  =	  “really	  good”)	  
	  
Question	  2:	  What	  if	  brides	  did	  wear	  yellow	  to	  weddings?	  Would	  that	  be	  bad?	  
If	  child	  said	  “yes”:	  Do	  you	  think	  it	  would	  be	  sort	  of	  bad,	  bad,	  or	  really	  bad	  if	  brides	  wore	  yellow	  to	  
weddings?1	  
Scoring:	  4-­‐point	  scale	  (1	  =	  “no”	  to	  4	  =	  “really	  bad”)	  
	  
Question	  3:	  Remember	  how	  we	  read	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings,	  and	  not	  a	  different	  color,	  like	  
yellow?	  Is	  that	  the	  way	  that	  things	  should	  be?	  Brides	  wearing	  white?	  	  
Scoring:	  0	  =	  “no”,	  1	  =	  “yes”	  
	  
	  
“Yes”	  Bias	  Control	  Question	  (Study	  2)	  (using	  the	  “brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings”	  fact)	  
	  
Do	  you	  think	  it’s	  interesting	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings,	  and	  not	  a	  different	  color,	  like	  yellow?	  Do	  
you	  think	  it’s	  interesting	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  to	  weddings?	  
If	  child	  said	  “yes”:	  Do	  you	  think	  it’s	  sort	  of	  interesting,	  interesting,	  or	  really	  interesting	  that	  brides	  wear	  
white	  to	  weddings?1	  
Scoring:	  4-­‐point	  scale	  (1	  =	  “no”	  to	  4	  =	  “really	  interesting”)	  
	  
	  
“Shallow	  Cues”	  Control	  Question	  (Study	  4)	  (using	  the	  “brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings”	  fact)	  
	  
Do	  you	  think	  it’s	  fun	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings?	  
If	  child	  said	  “yes”:	  Do	  you	  think	  it’s	  sort	  of	  fun,	  fun,	  or	  really	  fun	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  to	  weddings?1	  
If	  child	  said	  “no”:	  Do	  you	  think	  it’s	  sort	  of	  not	  fun,	  not	  fun,	  or	  really	  not	  fun	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  to	  
weddings?1	  










1 These questions were accompanied by a visual scale consisting of three circles of increasing size. Children could 
use this scale to respond non-verbally if they wished (i.e., by pointing to a circle).	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STUDY	  4	  (CHILDREN)	  
INHERENT	  VS.	  EXTRINSIC	  EXPLANATION	  MANIPULATION	  
Fact:	  Brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings	  
Inherent:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  just	  because	  there’s	  something	  
about	  white	  that	  makes	  it	  go	  with	  weddings.	  It’s	  because	  it’s	  really	  bright	  and	  so	  it	  makes	  people	  happy.	  Also,	  white	  
helps	  make	  the	  bride	  stand	  out	  and	  so	  everyone	  is	  looking	  at	  her	  at	  the	  wedding.	  So	  brides	  wear	  white	  wedding	  
dresses!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  guess	  there	  are	  real	  reasons	  why	  brides	  wear	  white.	  It’s	  not	  like	  it’s	  something	  that	  
happened	  by	  accident.	  There’s	  just	  something	  about	  white	  that	  explains	  why	  brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings.	  	  	  	  
	  
Extrinsic:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  just	  because	  of	  something	  that	  
happened	  a	  long	  time	  ago.	  It’s	  because	  a	  really	  important	  Queen	  wore	  white	  all	  the	  time—and	  of	  course	  she	  wore	  
white	  to	  her	  wedding	  too!	  So	  she	  just	  decided	  to	  wear	  a	  white	  dress	  to	  her	  wedding.	  After	  that,	  lots	  of	  brides	  started	  
wearing	  white	  wedding	  dresses	  to	  look	  like	  the	  Queen—even	  though	  they	  could	  have	  gotten	  them	  in	  other	  colors,	  
and	  even	  when	  the	  Queen	  wasn’t	  around	  anymore!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  guess	  there’s	  no	  real	  reason	  why	  brides	  wear	  
white.	  It’s	  not	  like	  there’s	  anything	  special	  about	  white	  that	  makes	  it	  go	  with	  brides.	  It’s	  just	  because	  of	  something	  
that	  happened	  a	  long	  time	  ago	  that	  brides	  wear	  white	  at	  weddings.	  	  
	  
	  
Fact:	  Boys	  wear	  pants	  
Inherent:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  boys	  wear	  pants	  just	  because	  there’s	  something	  about	  
pants	  that	  makes	  them	  go	  with	  boys.	  It’s	  because	  pants	  are	  easy	  to	  play	  sports	  in	  and	  boys	  play	  a	  lot	  of	  sports.	  Also,	  
pants	  help	  boys	  move	  around	  and	  so	  boys	  can	  use	  all	  of	  their	  energy.	  So	  boys	  wear	  pants!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  guess	  
there	  are	  real	  reasons	  why	  boys	  wear	  pants.	  	  It’s	  not	  like	  it’s	  something	  that	  happened	  by	  accident.	  There’s	  just	  
something	  about	  pants	  that	  explains	  why	  boys	  wear	  them.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Extrinsic:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  boys	  wear	  pants	  just	  because	  of	  something	  that	  
happened	  a	  long	  time	  ago.	  It’s	  because	  a	  well-­‐known	  General	  was	  the	  first	  person	  to	  start	  wearing	  pants—he	  owned	  
so	  many	  pants	  and	  that	  is	  all	  he	  wore!	  So	  he	  just	  decided	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  wear	  pants.	  After	  that,	  lots	  of	  boys	  
starting	  wearing	  pants	  to	  look	  like	  the	  General—even	  if	  there	  were	  other	  things	  to	  wear,	  and	  even	  when	  the	  General	  
wasn’t	  around	  anymore!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  guess	  there’s	  no	  real	  reason	  why	  boys	  wear	  pants.	  It’s	  not	  like	  there’s	  
anything	  special	  about	  pants	  that	  makes	  them	  go	  with	  boys.	  It’s	  just	  because	  of	  something	  that	  happened	  a	  long	  
time	  ago	  that	  boys	  wear	  pants.	  
	  
	  
Fact:	  Dads	  have	  short	  hair	  
Inherent:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  Dads	  have	  short	  hair	  just	  because	  there’s	  something	  
about	  short	  hair	  that	  makes	  it	  go	  with	  Dads.	  It’s	  because	  short	  hair	  fits	  under	  hats	  and	  Dads	  wear	  hats	  all	  the	  time.	  
Also,	  short	  hair	  helps	  Dads	  keep	  hair	  out	  of	  their	  face	  when	  it’s	  windy.	  So	  Dads	  have	  short	  hair!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  
guess	  there	  are	  real	  reasons	  why	  Dads	  have	  short	  hair.	  It’s	  not	  like	  it’s	  something	  that	  happened	  by	  accident.	  There’s	  
just	  something	  about	  short	  hair	  that	  explains	  why	  Dads	  wear	  their	  hair	  like	  that.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  
Extrinsic:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  Dads	  have	  short	  hair	  just	  because	  of	  something	  that	  
happened	  a	  long	  time	  ago.	  It’s	  because	  a	  really	  famous	  singer	  cut	  his	  hair	  short—his	  picture	  was	  in	  lots	  of	  famous	  
magazines	  so	  everyone	  saw	  his	  hair!	  So	  the	  singer	  just	  decided	  to	  cut	  his	  hair	  short.	  After	  that,	  lots	  of	  men	  started	  
cutting	  their	  hair	  short	  to	  look	  like	  the	  singer—even	  though	  there	  were	  other	  hairstyles,	  and	  even	  when	  the	  singer	  
wasn’t	  around	  anymore!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  guess	  there’s	  no	  real	  reason	  why	  Dads	  have	  short	  hair.	  It’s	  not	  like	  
there’s	  anything	  special	  about	  short	  hair	  that	  makes	  it	  go	  with	  dads.	  It’s	  just	  because	  of	  something	  that	  happened	  a	  
long	  time	  ago	  that	  Dads	  have	  short	  hair.	  	  
 39	  
	  
Fact:	  Money	  is	  green	  
Inherent:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  money	  is	  green	  just	  because	  there’s	  something	  about	  
the	  color	  green	  that	  makes	  it	  go	  with	  money.	  It’s	  because	  it’s	  easy	  to	  see	  and	  so	  it’s	  easy	  to	  use	  when	  you	  pay	  for	  
stuff!	  Also,	  green	  helps	  money	  look	  different	  from	  other	  paper	  so	  people	  don’t	  get	  confused.	  So	  money	  is	  green!	  
Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  guess	  there	  are	  real	  reasons	  why	  money	  is	  green.	  It’s	  not	  like	  it’s	  something	  that	  happened	  by	  
accident.	  There’s	  just	  something	  about	  the	  color	  green	  that	  explains	  why	  money	  is	  green.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Extrinsic:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  money	  is	  green	  just	  because	  of	  something	  that	  
happened	  a	  long	  time	  ago.	  It’s	  because	  an	  important	  businessman	  closed	  his	  eyes	  and	  picked	  a	  color	  out	  of	  a	  hat	  
[close	  eyes	  and	  motion	  picking	  out	  of	  a	  hat]—there	  were	  lots	  of	  colors	  in	  the	  hat,	  and	  he	  happened	  to	  pick	  green!	  So	  
he	  just	  decided	  to	  use	  green	  for	  money.	  After	  that,	  people	  kept	  making	  money	  green	  like	  the	  businessman	  picked—
even	  when	  there	  were	  lots	  of	  other	  colors,	  and	  even	  when	  the	  businessman	  wasn’t	  around	  anymore!	  Interesting,	  
huh?	  I	  guess	  there’s	  no	  real	  reason	  why	  money	  is	  green.	  It’s	  not	  like	  there’s	  anything	  special	  about	  green	  that	  makes	  
it	  go	  with	  money.	  It’s	  just	  because	  of	  something	  that	  happened	  a	  long	  time	  ago	  that	  money	  is	  green.	  
	  
	  
Fact:	  School	  buses	  are	  yellow	  
Inherent:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  school	  buses	  are	  yellow	  just	  because	  there’s	  
something	  about	  the	  color	  yellow	  that	  makes	  it	  go	  with	  school	  buses.	  It’s	  because	  it	  makes	  people	  in	  cars	  pay	  
attention	  and	  so	  they	  drive	  safely	  around	  the	  school	  bus!	  Also,	  yellow	  helps	  kids	  see	  that	  their	  school	  bus	  is	  close	  
when	  they	  wait	  at	  the	  bus	  stop.	  So	  buses	  are	  yellow!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  guess	  there	  are	  real	  reasons	  why	  school	  
buses	  are	  yellow.	  It’s	  not	  like	  it’s	  something	  that	  happened	  by	  accident.	  There’s	  just	  something	  about	  the	  color	  
yellow	  that	  explains	  why	  school	  buses	  are	  yellow.	  
.	  	  	  	  
Extrinsic:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  buses	  are	  yellow	  just	  because	  of	  something	  that	  
happened	  a	  long	  time	  ago.	  It’s	  because	  an	  important	  person	  in	  charge	  of	  schools	  wanted	  to	  paint	  the	  first	  school	  bus	  
yellow—she	  picked	  yellow	  because	  she	  had	  lots	  of	  yellow	  flowers	  in	  her	  yard,	  and	  she	  really	  liked	  them.	  So	  she	  just	  
decided	  to	  make	  buses	  yellow!	  After	  that,	  lots	  of	  people	  kept	  making	  buses	  yellow	  like	  the	  person	  picked—even	  
though	  they	  could	  have	  gotten	  other	  paint,	  and	  even	  when	  the	  person	  who	  picked	  yellow	  wasn’t	  in	  charge	  of	  schools	  
anymore!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  guess	  there’s	  no	  real	  reason	  why	  buses	  are	  yellow.	  It’s	  not	  like	  there’s	  anything	  special	  




Fact:	  Birthday	  cakes	  have	  candles	  
Inherent:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  birthday	  cakes	  have	  candles	  just	  because	  there’s	  
something	  about	  candles	  that	  makes	  them	  go	  with	  birthday	  cakes.	  It’s	  because	  you	  can	  put	  as	  many	  as	  you	  need	  on	  
your	  birthday	  cake,	  and	  so	  they’re	  easy	  to	  count	  your	  years	  on!	  Also,	  candles	  help	  birthday	  cakes	  look	  bright	  and	  
colorful	  which	  makes	  people	  happy.	  So	  birthday	  cakes	  have	  candles!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  It’s	  not	  like	  it’s	  something	  that	  
happened	  by	  accident.	  I	  guess	  there	  are	  real	  reasons	  why	  birthday	  cakes	  have	  candles.	  There’s	  just	  something	  about	  
candles	  that	  explains	  why	  birthday	  cakes	  have	  them.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  
Extrinsic:	  I	  read	  a	  book	  a	  while	  ago	  about	  this,	  and	  it	  said	  that	  birthday	  cakes	  have	  candles	  just	  because	  of	  something	  
that	  happened	  a	  long	  time	  ago.	  It’s	  because	  an	  important	  President	  had	  a	  friend	  who	  was	  a	  candle	  maker—	  his	  friend	  
gave	  him	  so	  many	  candles	  and	  he	  needed	  something	  to	  do	  with	  them.	  So	  he	  decided	  to	  put	  them	  on	  birthday	  cakes!	  
After	  that,	  lots	  of	  people	  started	  putting	  candles	  on	  birthday	  cakes	  to	  be	  like	  the	  President—even	  though	  they	  could	  
have	  put	  something	  else	  on	  them,	  and	  even	  when	  the	  President	  wasn’t	  around	  anymore!	  Interesting,	  huh?	  I	  guess	  
there’s	  no	  real	  reason	  why	  birthday	  cakes	  have	  candles.	  It’s	  not	  like	  there’s	  anything	  special	  about	  candles	  that	  
makes	  them	  go	  with	  birthday	  cakes.	  It’s	  just	  because	  of	  something	  that	  happened	  a	  long	  time	  ago	  that	  birthday	  cakes	  
have	  candles.	  	  
